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Critique in statu nascendi? The Reluctance  
towards Organ Donation 
Frank Adloff & Larissa Pfaller ∗ 
Abstract: »Kritik in statu nascendi? Die Zurückhaltung gegenüber der Organ-
spende«. This article offers a differentiated characterization of those who are 
uncertain, skeptical, or reluctant in their attitude to organ donation. We ex-
plore if and how skepticism about organ donation can be expressed and enact-
ed against the background of moral imperatives in favor of donation. To that 
end, we take a closer look at one paradigmatic case from our sample and dis-
cuss the sense of ‘unease’ experienced with regards to organ donation as a 
form of critique that finds itself in a major conflict: the moral imperative to 
help and to ‘save lives’ confronts an unbearable disregard and disrespect for 
personal integrity and leads to a feeling of trouble and shame. People are often 
unable to show that the ethical value of the integrity of the person has equiva-
lent value to the rightness of saving lives. This is related to the fact that the 
pure materiality of the human body is such a dominant theme in the medical 
discourse that positions that speak of the dignity of the person (and this in-
cludes the body as well) beyond the grave are not only marginalized but lack 
the very vocabulary they need to argue this position. Thus, the article contrib-
utes to our understanding of the affective, physical bases for unease and cri-
tique. 
Keywords: Organ donation, unease, validity claims, disrespect, integrity of the 
person, focus groups, interviews. 
1.  Introduction  
Amongst the general public, the impression exists that ethically speaking there 
can be no question – it is even seen as a moral imperative – that everyone 
should demonstrate their willingness to donate their organs. There are many 
people who feel uneasy about this, without, however, being able to precisely 
articulate what the source of their discomfort is. They find it difficult to trans-
late this feeling into intersubjectively comprehensible arguments and are thus 
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unable to convey their misgivings about the dominant discourse into a deter-
mined critique. This is related first of all to the fact that they lack the appropri-
ate ethical language to be able to formulate their unease. Secondly, this disquiet 
is dismissed within the medical discourse – it is relegated to the realm of pri-
vate idiosyncrasy. We intend to show, based on this example, that skepticism, 
unease, and reluctance vis-à-vis organ donation can be reconstructed as a cri-
tique in statu nascendi. Reference is made here (even before any propositional-
ly formulated argument) to the value of the human person and its bodily integ-
rity. This critique is located in propinquity, affect, and corporeality, and not in 
the rational, academic discourse of distance. However, it remains to be seen 
whether in future this actually leads to a credible discourse position of explicit 
criticism and thus of changing the dominant discourse. 
This is the starting point for our study. We aim to offer a better understand-
ing and differentiated characterization of those who are uncertain, skeptical, or 
reluctant in their attitude to organ donation. In the course of the study, we con-
ducted focus groups and interviews, and we supplemented our data with docu-
mentations of congresses, document analyses, and expert interviews. We ex-
plore if and how skepticism about organ donation can be expressed and enacted 
against the background of moral imperatives in favor of donation. We recon-
struct different types of ‘saying no’ to organ donation – the no killing position, 
the information deficit position, the mistrust position and the (bodily) integrity 
position (for details see: Pfaller et al. under review) – and unveil the difficulties 
in expressing skepticism regarding organ donation, which do not relate exclu-
sively to the concrete praxis of implementation (keyword: scandals). 
In this article, we set out to get closer to an answer to why the ‘no’ to organ 
donation is so difficult and whether a form of critique is articulated in the act of 
repudiation. To that end, we take a closer look at one paradigmatic case from 
our sample. In doing so, we discuss the sense of ‘unease’ experienced with 
regard to organ donation as a form of critique that finds itself in a major con-
flict: the moral imperative to help and to ‘save lives’ – rightness as a ‘validity 
claim’ (Habermas 1985) – confronts an unbearable disregard and ‘disrespect’ 
(Honneth 1972) for personal integrity and leads to a feeling of trouble and 
shame. Yet the people interviewed in the study were unable to show that the 
ethical value of the integrity of the person has equivalent value to the rightness 
of saving lives. This is related to the fact that the pure materiality of the human 
body is such a dominant theme in the medical discourse that positions that 
speak of the dignity of the person (and this includes the body as well) beyond 
the grave are not only marginalized but lack the very vocabulary they need to 
argue this position. The article should be seen then as a contribution to our 
understanding of the affective, physical bases for unease, defiance, and critique 
(the emotional base of critique and the difficulties expressing critique are also 
analyzed by Schwarz (2017) and Wallmeier (2017) in this volume). 
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2.  Background: Organ Donation in Germany 
In Germany as well as in other Western countries, organ transplantation is seen 
as an integral part of modern medicine. However, post mortem organ donation 
is a comparatively rare incident and only a very few of those who signed an 
organ donor card will actually end up being organ donors. This is because post 
mortem organ donation is only possible if the person in question is reported 
brain dead. In 2015 the German National Medical Association replaced the 
better known and more frequently used term ‘brain death’ with the term ‘irre-
versible loss of brain function’ (irreversibler Hirnfunktionsausfall) and drew 
up stricter guidelines for its detection (Bundesärztekammer 2015). Germany 
still holds to the definition that this state equates to the death of a human being, 
as the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School first described it in 
1968 (Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School 1968). The use of 
brain death as a legal definition of decease allows a person to be declared legal-
ly dead while being kept on life support, where all the organs apart from the 
brain are still working, thus making organ donation possible. In Germany, brain 
death is recorded about 2,000 times per year.1 Bearing in mind that there are 
about 900,000 deaths altogether (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016), only about 0.2 
per cent of all deceased are potential organ donors. About half of them – for 
example, 877 people in 2015 (DSO 2016) – actually become donors.  
Although these facts and figures are known, ‘organ shortage’ – the gap be-
tween transplantable organs and the number of patients on the waiting list for 
organ donation – is commonly reduced to a lack of willingness among the 
German population to donate and is subject to public censure. This is exemplified 
by a headline that appeared in Die Zeit, a widespread German weekly, in 2013: 
“Germans are stingy with their organs” (Deutsche geizen mit ihren Organen) 
(Powell 2013). The common interpretation of people’s reluctance to donate 
their organs reduces this phenomenon to a lack of information (e.g. Tumin et 
al. 2013) or the mistrust and dented confidence felt after the so-called allocation 
scandals of 2012 (e.g. Hyde 2012; Pondrom 2013; Schwettmann 2015).  
In Germany, the permission to explant organs depends on the explicit con-
sent of the donor, made during his or her lifetime. Here, as in other countries 
with an ‘opt-in’ model, the will of the deceased is accepted as legally binding, 
and if it is not documented on a donor card or otherwise, the relatives are asked 
to reconstruct the presumed will of the (potential) donor.  
The German Organ Transplantation Foundation (DSO) is responsible for 
coordinating organ donation in Germany, while Eurotransplant is responsible 
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for the allocation not only in Germany but in and between eight European 
countries. The Federal Centre for Health Education (BZgA) is charged with 
providing information and promoting organ donation among the public. Up 
until 2001 it was allocated a sum of 2.4 million marks (Deutscher Bundestag 
2003, 42). But the funding was greatly increased after the German Transplanta-
tion Act (Transplantationsgesetz – TPG) was restructured in 2013. Today, the 
BZgA receives approximately 7.5 million euro per year for the design and 
distribution of campaigns (Deutscher Bundestag 2014; see also: Hansen et al. 
under review).  
The public discourse in Germany (and elsewhere) suggests that donating or-
gans after one’s death is an altruistic and normatively correct act (Motakef 
2011). Therefore, in the public discourse as well as in most academic ap-
proaches, the reluctance to donate seems merely to be something that is to be 
overcome. Thus, it comes as no surprise that public campaigns only show mor-
al arguments in favor of organ donation like altruism, responsibility, or social 
conformity, and do not refer to uncertainty, reluctance, or critique (Hansen et 
al. under review). 
The decline in the actual number of organ donations since 2010 (2010: 
1,296; 2012: 1,046; 2013: 876; now stabilized at a lower level – 2014: 864; 
2015: 877) (DSO 2016) was repeatedly interpreted as a significant drop after 
the 2012 German allocation scandals and put down to public mistrust in the 
system by the media as well as in academic articles (Hyde 2012; Schwettmann 
2015). But the evidential basis for the mistrust induced by the scandals and 
resulting decrease in donation rates and the public reluctance to hold donor 
cards has rarely been questioned (Schicktanz et al. 2016). It was considered to 
be an understandable and politically consistent position and was also the sub-
ject of international discussion (Neuberger and Murphy 2013; Pondrom 2013; 
Shaw, Neuberger and Murphy 2013).  
Before the scandals, the explanation for the low number of donor cards and 
donation rates in Germany was mainly based on the information deficit para-
digm, the idea that reluctance is caused by a lack of information about the need 
for organs, the credibility of the brain-death diagnosis, or the reliability of the 
allocation system (Hoeyer, Jensen and Olejaz 2015). In August 2012, therefore, 
an important revision in the German TPG in favor for the so-called ‘infor-
mation rule’ was enforced (Siegmund-Schultze 2013). This law obliges the 
health insurance companies in Germany to send the relevant materials to all 
insurees including an organ donor card. 
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3.  Material and Method 
By means of qualitative social research, we explore whether and how skepti-
cism about organ donation can be expressed and enacted against the back-
ground of moral imperatives surrounding the theme of organ shortage. Our 
findings are based on interviews, focus groups, expert interviews, documenta-
tion (of congresses, workshops, and events), as well as self-portrayals (e.g. 
websites) of organ donation critics and supporters. Participants in the inter-
views and focus groups cover a broad spectrum of attitudes regarding organ 
donation: this ranged from the statement “Organ donation is an interesting 
topic, which is worth talking about,” or undecidedness, to a discomfort that 
cannot be articulated, a guilty conscience or helplessness, and ultimately to 
skepticism, feeling queasy, or arguments overtly based on unequivocal opin-
ions. But also proponents of organ donation were interviewed – keeping in 
mind that also people who decided to be an organ donor can have ambivalent 
attitudes regarding organ donation. 
We conducted nine focus groups and 17 interviews with those who are un-
decided, are skeptical, or have negative feelings regarding organ donations, as 
well as laypeople who are interested in the issue as well as with experts on the 
field (60 participants in total, status September 2016) within the framework of 
the project “‘I would prefer not to.’ Organ donation between unease and criti-
cism. A sociological and ethical analysis,” funded by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG - AD 318/5-1, SCHI 631/7-1). 
All of the interviewees and participants in the focus groups were recruited 
through leaflets and posters, as well as announcements in specific online fo-
rums and organizations, and snowball sampling. Recruitment took place in 
accordance with the grounded theory approach of theoretical sampling, in 
which the search for minimal and maximal contrasts serves as a leading princi-
ple (see Glaser and Strauss 2009). Similar and diverse cases were sampled to 
reconstruct the smaller sections of the field, as well as to understand the entire 
spectrum of cases. Thus, the overall sample was developed step by step, itera-
tively referring back to the ongoing data analysis. During the recruiting pro-
cess, all of the respondents were informed about the consultation method, data 
protection, and incentives.  
In the selection of participants and the composition of the focus groups, we 
aimed for a balance of both age (21-86 years, average 46 years) and gender (39 
female and 21 male). The selected participants signed an informed consent 
sheet that explained the aims and the setting of the project in detail. Before the 
study was launched, it was approved by the institutional review board (IRB) of 
the University Medical Center in Göttingen, Germany. The interviews and 
focus groups were conducted in different German cities (Berlin, Hamburg, 
München, Nürnberg, Erlangen, Göttingen, etc.) in 2015 and 2016. The focus 
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groups were moderated by two facilitators using a semi-structured question-
naire on attitudes and experiences regarding organ donations, current cam-
paigns, the donor card, the scandals, and reactions on expressed criticism or 
uncertainty, as well as everyday life scenarios – for example, on filling out a 
donor card. The discussions and interviews were audiotaped and the recordings 
transcribed. The respondents were given pseudonyms, and only information 
regarding their gender (Mr./Ms.) and age (in parentheses behind the pseudo-
nym initial) has been provided here. 
In the interpretation of the data, we followed the implications of the docu-
mentary method (Bohnsack 2010) and thus a reconstructive paradigm. Taking 
into account that meaning is always created in the course of a concrete se-
quence of speech acts, both the focus groups and the interviews were analyzed 
using a sequence analysis (Nohl 2009), and individual statements could be 
interpreted as ‘documents’ of overarching orientations. In an ongoing process 
of comparing the analyzed cases, typical argumentation and orientation patterns 
of “saying no to organ donation” could be reconstructed as we describe them in 
the following section.  
4.  Four Types of Rejection 
As we discuss elsewhere in detail (Pfaller et al. under review), we actually find 
the argumentation patterns ‘information deficit’ and ‘mistrust’ used by the 
participants in interviews and focus groups: the information deficit position 
refuses to take decisions under uncertainty and claims that true decisions can 
only be made if all the consequences can be foreseen. In the case of organ 
donation the proponents do not feel sufficiently informed to decide whether 
they are for or against organ donation. The mistrust position says no to organ 
donation in light of suspicions about a corrupt and devious medical system. 
This can be the result of human error as well as fraud and corruption, as was 
experienced during the German “organ allocation scandals.” The proponents 
don’t reject organ donation as such: some err on the side of caution by selecting 
the ‘no’ option on the card, but for others the imperative to help is much 
stronger than their reservations, and they admit to being organ donors for su-
pererogatory reasons. Besides these well-known arguments, we find two strong 
forms of critique that are not addressed in campaigns or in public discourse: the 
first one, the no killing position indicates that brain death is not the definitive 
moment of death for human beings and thus the current practice of organ dona-
tion is comparable to homicide. The position does not reject organ donation as 
such but the concrete practice of using brain-dead persons as donors. Unlike 
the other types, this form of critique can be found organized in different groups 
and is voiced in open letters, self-made documentaries, and the like, trying to 
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inform the public about wrongdoing and to perform educational work. Propo-
nents of this type of critique sometimes carry “alternative organ donor cards” 
documenting their will to not even undergo brain-death diagnosis. The second 
type of critique we found that was not discussed broadly in public discourse we 
have called the (bodily) integrity position. This position puts saying no to organ 
donation on a level with protecting one’s own bodily and personal integrity. 
Unlike the other positions, it doesn’t refer to the current practice of organ dona-
tion and its proponents may also feel uneasy with living organ donation, as the 
mere idea of transferring one organ from one body to another contradicts their 
Weltanschauung (world-view) and lived concepts of the body. The moral im-
perative of campaigns is experienced as infringement. As a consequence, these 
people do not carry a donor card or have decided against organ donation but 
some of them tend to feel guilty about their defensiveness and reluctance be-
cause their position often cannot be articulated in terms of a propositional ar-
gument and thus cannot refer to acknowledged ‘justifications’ (cf. Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006). 
The information deficit position and the mistrust position can base their line 
of reasoning on high-profile arguments explaining the lack of willingness to 
donate organs in public and academic discourse and thus offer, first and fore-
most, effective justifications. The critique of brain death (no killing position) 
and the (bodily) integrity position refer to more intrinsic, irreducible, and gen-
eralizable values relating to the inviolability of the person and human dignity. 
The former represents a morally justified and consistent position, but the un-
ease underlying the (bodily) integrity position is particularly difficult to articu-
late and put forward as a reasoned argument. The interviewees and focus group 
participants who feel ‘uneasy’ with organ donation find it extremely hard to 
express their reservations. This becomes especially obvious when confronted 
with organ donation poster campaigns, as the following sequence from a focus 
group shows: 
Ms. Schröder (40): You have to pluck up more courage to say no. 
Ms. Neumann (59): Yes, the suggestion is that you are rejecting something – 
you’re saying no to something that is actually good. That means you don’t un-
derstand what good is. 
Ms. Schröder (40): Yes, you’re a bad person, an evil person. 
In order to understand the difficulty of this critique of organ donation, we mainly 
focus on one paradigmatic case and provide an in-depth interpretation to discuss 
the ‘unease’ as a form of critique in the following section. We chose this inter-
view because it reveals fundamental and deep ambivalences regarding organ 
donation in one person. We have a theoretical understanding of the ambiva-
lences and conflicts that are evident here based on Habermas’s ideas (1985), 
seeing them as a specific, strained constellation of contradictory but equally 
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credible “validity claims.” The nascent critique, which still has no clearly de-
fined vocabulary, comes out of an ethical perspective that nonetheless is de-
flected by the hegemonic truth and rightness discourse of medicine and politics. 
5.  ”A Little Bit Creepy” – The Position of Bodily Integrity 
For this article, we chose the case of Ms. Fischer (interview). Ms. Fischer is 
thirty-four years old, is married, and has one child. Although she thinks organ 
donation is important and right, she doesn’t hold a donor card. She also finds 
the ‘no’ position a difficult one: she feels under pressure from the campaigns 
but sees them as positive because she would actually like to see herself as a 
supporter and advocate of organ donation. The campaigns made it look as 
though 
it was a completely normal or straightforward thing to do, without thinking 
twice about it. As if it were an easy decision, but somehow it’s not for me, is 
it? I’d love to be so laid-back. […] Actually, I feel pretty much ashamed that I 
don’t have one [a donor card]. I have a bad conscience about it. (Interview 
with Ms. Fischer [34]) 
Against this background – the wish that she could fill out a donor card with the 
same degree of ease that one sees in the campaigns, coupled with her own 
procrastination and the shame that results from it (more on this below) – we 
will now examine the first part of the interview: 
Interviewer: We are especially interested in your personal experience, your 
personal thinking about organ donation and about donor cards. What got you 
interested in that? 
Ms. Fischer: I’ve been interested in it for a long time and always have a bad 
conscience walking past the cards you can fill out. And as it’s on my mind and 
my thoughts are a bit of a muddle and I kind of can’t really make up my mind, 
I thought it could be a great option to get a bit more information by talking 
about it with you. Or maybe get a bit clearer through the interview or from 
talking about it – that’s what I was kind of hoping. And if I’m right to have 
my, you know, worries about it or am I totally mistaken? Yeah, that’s it. 
Interviewer: What are the worries you just mentioned? What are the things 
that are bothering you or make you anxious? 
Ms. Fischer: I don’t know if it’s maybe true – quite a few people are kind of 
saying it – that you maybe worry a bit that, with donating an organ, when it 
turns out you’re dying, that somehow … I dunno, if you’ve got a donor card, 
they somehow pull the plug on you quicker or something like that or just … 
Mind you, I’m no big fan of major life support measures, but somehow you’ve 
maybe heard two or three creepy stories at some point in your life, right? One 
stupid story or another. And somehow they stick in your mind and I’m actual-
ly a really caring person and really committed to that kind of thing. And my 
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husband’s just the same. And neither of us have donor cards and we don’t re-
ally know exactly why that is. 
Interviewer: Ok. And have you talked about that? 
Ms. Fischer: Yeah, but only recently. When I told him about the study being 
done here, and then he said, yeah, he didn’t have one either and he was hoping 
I could clue him in about it because the reasons he doesn’t have a card are just 
the same as mine. You hear things like, I dunno… is that something common? 
Are there maybe lots of people with these worries, that maybe they won’t put 
you on life support? 
Interviewer: Of course. 
Ms. Fischer: That’s the main reason. Yeah, that’s actually one of the only rea-
sons, I reckon, that you just don’t know enough. What’s going to be done with 
the organs? When do they get removed? What about when I’m laid out in the 
coffin? How’s that gonna be? Will I look all hollowed out without eyes? Or 
will I get gutted as a source of spare parts? It’s all a bit like that, a bit kind of 
creepy. On the one hand, you don’t care what happens to you because you’re 
not there anymore but, on the other, you maybe have these kind of slaughter-
house thoughts that are a bit of a turn-off. Yeah. But for all that [laughs], I ac-
tually still want to do it. I want to maybe find out in this conversation whether 
I’m going to go ahead and take the plunge. 
Ms. Fischer starts the interview by mentioning that she feels guilty about not 
having an organ donor card. The cards feel like a challenge. Her own feelings 
and thoughts that are “muddled” and might possibly be “mistaken” are con-
trasted with neutral “information” and getting “clearer.” The talk documented 
the widespread interpretation of the information deficit paradigm: for her own 
part she adapts this and makes a separate interpretation (“quite a few people are 
kind of saying it”) and reduces her own insecurity, vacillation, and worries to a 
lack of information, because the argument in the media discourse on organ 
donation and in the advertising campaigns, as described earlier, is that making 
a decision is simply a question of reading up about it. At the same time the 
suggestion is that agreeing to organ donation is a correct decision (“to save 
lives”) (Hansen et al. under review). She seeks to put her worries down to 
“creepy stories,” but she does not elaborate or give more detail about these 
stories and refers to possible irregularities in organ transplantation (turning off 
life support too soon). The first part of the interview is thus characterized by 
the two prevailing patterns of interpretation behind an unwillingness to become 
an organ donor – information deficit and mistrust.  
However, Ms. Fischer has not set her mind at rest with this interpretation, as 
the conversation documents a fundamental underlying sense of crisis: she de-
scribes herself and her husband as “really caring” and committed people and 
contrasts this positive identification with the fact that neither she nor her hus-
band has a donor card. Here she presents a disparity that does not tally with the 
explanations she offers, as caring and committed people can also decide against 
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a practice that is acknowledged as (in fact) positive and correct when they have 
good reasons for it (for example, shortcomings in the actual practice of organ 
donation). But the reasons she cites for hesitating to fill out a donor card do not 
seem sufficient to her as she and her husband “don’t really know exactly why” 
they don’t have a card. There seem, then, to be other motives at work here, 
which set the possibility of becoming an organ donor apart from, say, giving 
blood or registering as a potential bone marrow donor (Ms. Fischer reports that 
she is persuaded by both of these and makes no reference to the role infor-
mation plays).2  
In the final paragraph Ms. Fischer abandons the level of argumentation. She 
imagines herself in a possible future organ donor scenario, in which she views 
her position with concern: “What about when I’m laid out in the coffin? How’s 
that gonna be? Will I look all hollowed out without eyes?” Here it is clear that 
Ms. Fischer believes that her own person will also endure beyond the grave and 
may be exposed to possible violation. This violation constitutes an act of de-
humanization: “source of spare parts” refers to degrading the human body to 
mere material, “slaughterhouse” to being reduced to livestock. Reference can 
be made here to Ralf Stoecker’s concept of human dignity: Stoecker describes 
human dignity as something that proves its validity first and foremost in the 
violation of it. He describes this violation above all as a form of procedure that 
no longer treats the other as a person (i.e. as someone who has a persona, a 
self) (Stoecker 2003). In Ms. Fischer’s case we can construe that when it comes 
to organ donation, it is not merely her body but her own person and its dignity 
that are at stake.  
6. Truth, Rightness, Truthfulness – and Ethical Validity 
Claims?  
In Habermasian terms, the crisis that emerges as a paradigm in the interview 
with Ms. Fischer can be theoretically understood as a specific constellation of 
different “validity claims” (Habermas 1985): the discourse surrounding organ 
donation is characterized by medical interpretations, which lay claim to validity 
in hegemonic style. Thus in the first instance the ‘truth’ is brokered from 
statements.3 This naturally includes the statement that the level of information 
                                                             
2  Whether Ms. Fischer actually is a blood donor and a registered bone marrow donor is beside 
the point, as the focus here is on the moral and emotional position to such procedures, be-
fore any action is taken. 
3  The relative success (groups, institutionalization) of the critique of the brain death concept 
also has a bearing here. With regard to the acceptance of brain death as a person’s decease, 
arguments can be formulated on the level of theoretical (medical) ‘truth.’ 
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is a crucial factor in the decision to become an organ donor (indeed, taken on 
its own, the way the attitude to organ donation is framed as a decision makes 
this clear). One is prompted to obtain information in order to be able to make a 
decision; however, there is no support for normative questions. Thus Ms. 
Fischer can only explain her attitude to organ donation as an information defi-
cit, in the terminology offered by the discourse. This discourse provides no 
language that would make it possible to really interrogate one’s own ideas 
about corporeality, violability, and transmortality – in fact, the reverse is true: 
the decision is put across to us as “completely straightforward” (Hansen et al. 
under review). Ms. Fischer also questions her own misgivings (validity claim: 
truthfulness) in terms of whether they are “right” or “mistaken,” thus connect-
ing them to a factual situation; she is looking for (“true”) scientific, i.e. “neu-
tral” and “reified,” information to enable her to decide (“correctly”) against 
donating.4 This contradiction – reference being made only to the search for 
further (true) information as a means to answer normative questions – is ex-
pressed in “muddled thoughts,” as Ms. Fischer puts it.  
The level of normative ‘rightness’ is also not discussed, but merely posited, 
in the public discourse, since organ donation is assumed in principle to be a 
morally correct and pro-caring stance. This normative rightness is accepted as a 
given by Ms. Fischer so that her conflict is presented as a conflict between the 
validity claim of the rightness of “saving lives” by donating and the feeling of 
unbearable disregard and “disrespect” (Honneth 1996) of the personal integrity 
and dignity of the individual person (Joas 2013; Stoecker 2003). Since this 
conflict cannot be resolved, because the moral imperative of “saving lives” 
cannot be weighed against the dignity of the individual person, Ms. Fischer 
experiences constant feelings of shame and guilt, her “bad conscience.” Here 
she fails to acknowledge that her self-caring attitude and resonance towards her 
own person is justified (cf. Rosa 2016). 
There are good reasons (human dignity) for her unease about organ dona-
tion, which she repeatedly describes – both in the passage quoted and through-
out the interview – with the expression “creepy”; however, this correlation is 
difficult to articulate in everyday life.5 She expresses a desire for body integrity 
                                                             
4  In our everyday discourse ‘anxiety’ would be a good place of refuge, because an irreducible 
validity is ascribed to our own experience, against which it is seemingly impossible to formu-
late arguments. It cannot, however, become a generally valid argument in a discourse, because 
as personal experience it is difficult to generalize and as a result no great validity is attached to 
it in the discourse (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). In the discourse repeated explication is also 
given of the fact that – despite it being morally correct to donate one’s organs – there may 
well be individual reasons for not donating; but since these are ‘individual’ and thus cannot 
be generalized per se, they cannot be used as potent arguments in the discourse. 
5  A rare example, and thus an exception in the material, is a nurse who has worked for years 
with brain-dead patients and concluded her address at the 2015 DSO congress with the 
 
 HSR 42 (2017) 3  │  35 
even after death and therefore makes a reference to the vindicatory character of 
human rights and dignity – without being able to name this explicitly. It is 
impossible to find a way to enter into discourse for this idea: at the latest since 
the two major Christian churches came out in support of organ donation and 
declared that it was not in conflict with the resurrection of the body, it has been 
difficult to formulate reasons against organ donation from the point of view of 
bodily integrity. So this position does not have the same status as the ‘right-
ness’ argument of saving lives. Bodily integrity is relegated to the status of an 
ethical motivation. If ideas of rightness are violated, it is usually quite easy to 
criticize them normatively, since it is possible to relate to and rely on a measure 
that is broadly shared between different subjects. Ethical questions are, so to 
speak, at the midpoint between judgements of taste, which it makes no sense to 
debate, and general moral dos and don’ts (cf. Jaeggi 2013). However, this 
ethical position cannot be recognized: Ms. Fischer actually abandons her nor-
mative activity and goes to the limits of her ability to express herself. Her reso-
nance towards herself and critical competence is restricted by the inadequacy 
of an openly accessible form of semantics. 
In the final sentences of the interview extract, the constellation of validity 
claims is pointedly expressed with “on the one hand,” “on the other,” and “ac-
tually”: on the one hand, we have the interpretative power of modern medicine 
(truth), which equates the death of the human with brain death and brain death 
with the end of the personality as a site of experience. The result of this has 
been that “you don’t care” what happens to your own body “because you’re not 
there anymore.” On the other hand, there are the irreducible feelings (truthful-
ness) of violation, dehumanization, and degradation that are tied up with the 
idea of organ donation and can be reconstructed as an ethical (and not as a 
private or idiosyncratic) motivation. In contrast to the medical interpretation, 
the possible future treatment of one’s own dead body is experienced as a con-
stituent part of the integrity of the individual person. At the same time there is a 
fundamentally positive attitude to organ donation as morally correct behavior 
(normative rightness), which honors those who comply with it as part of a 
community of values. That this constellation – the simultaneous validation of 
irreconcilable claims – is experienced as strained and contradictory can be seen 
not least in the little laugh that accompanied the interviewee’s “but for all that” 
at the end of this section of the interview. 
                                                                                                                                
words: “I refer to article 1 of the German Basic Law when I say that the dignity of the 
human being is inviolable, even beyond the grave” (own notes). 
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7.  Conclusions 
Even if the value system on which their negative response is based cannot 
always be named by the actors or formulated as an argument, the skeptical 
attitude towards the practice of organ donation reflects the ethical ideas of a 
comprehensible conduct of life; the ‘unease’ expresses values relating to the 
inviolability of the person (Joas 2013). However, such ethical pluralities sur-
rounding concepts of the body and notions of death do not find acceptance in 
the organ donation discourse.  
The attitude towards organ donation is framed as a decision that should be 
taken by each individual. A negative response is thus viewed as the product of 
‘private’ or ‘individual’ arguments. Individual particularities or sensitivities, 
however, cannot be formulated in a discourse as a generally valid argument and 
can therefore have no recourse to any recognized “system of justification,” as 
the recognition of an argument increases with the level of generalizability (cf. 
Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Boltanski 2010). The acceptance of the negative 
response to organ donation as the consequence of a generalizable ethical value 
(human dignity and bodily integrity, even of the deceased) would enable this to 
become a possible position, one that is recognized in the discourse. 
Ms. Fischer attempts to articulate the idea that the violation of an individual’s 
dead body and thus their identity and personhood constitutes a violation of 
human dignity, as personhood and human dignity are inextricably intertwined 
(Joas 2013). This might explain why the proponents of this position experience 
the mere imperative to take a decision on organ donation as an infringement, 
since values like human dignity are not up for negotiation or a question of 
decision. This kind of ‘no’ can be described as a “judgment of the body” (Sol-
omon 2009) – it is affectively anchored, pre-propositional, and difficult to 
articulate. It manifests an assessment: one feels bodily repelled, has a feeling of 
uneasiness, and uses indeterminate words like “creepy.” Affects can signal 
values and their violation just as much as the semantics of justification (Thé-
venot 2011, 549). Affectively anchored values can thus be seen as pre-semantic 
forms of critique that must not be overlooked (something which is underesti-
mated by Habermas in his optimistic view of our ability to verbalize explicit 
arguments). 
Ms. Fischer feels shame since she cannot satisfy the standards of a worthy 
person who wants to save others’ lives. Shame is a social emotion per se; it is 
based on one’s perception of oneself from the perspective of others (Scheff 
1997). It originates from an evaluative assumption of roles and perspectives 
and thus represents a sense of value and a moral emotion (cf. Wollheim 2001). 
If the evaluation of our own self turns out to be negative from the assumed 
perspective of others, this typically leads to a feeling of shame, causing us to 
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experience ourselves as worthless, contemptible, or wretched. The background 
to this feeling of shame is a value quality with which the person should actually 
comply in accordance with his or her own self-image but which he or she is 
unable to do. In the case of organ donation, the value of saving a life, which 
one actually aspires to, leads to feelings of shame based on a lack of readiness 
to donate one’s organs, without – from the point of view of the person in ques-
tion – being able to give sufficient reasons for this reluctance. 
Thus in the case of Ms. Fischer and other interviewees, we observe that they 
move along a continuum of critique (cf. Potthast 2011). For many, the brain 
death criterion thus represents a critical starting point that can, to some extent, 
find resonance in the medical system. By contrast, the bodily integrity position 
is in the liminal area of verbalization. Historically speaking, this must also have 
been the fate of the initial critique of racism or feminism. These critiques start-
ed with sensitivity, individual experiences, and affectivity before they managed 
to overcome their inarticulacy and create a language of argumentation (cf. 
Terkessidis 2015, 283 ff.). Here it is necessary to be able to translate an indi-
vidual into a universal position. It is important to overcome individual differ-
ences and particularities by way of identifying forms of equivalence and com-
parability (Boltanski 2010, 69). The case of organ donation also makes it clear 
that sociology should take an interest in the affective and physical bases of 
ethical value systems and critiques. A critique is never simply a verbally elabo-
rated criticism, never just based on distance and reification, but is rooted in 
experiences that must be articulated and translated from the subjective into the 
collective. A sociology of critique (Boltanski) should take notice of these pro-
cesses since they often substitute or accompany semantic forms of critique. 
This process of translation is obstructed by institutionalized knowledge pro-
duction, which specifies an inside and an outside: anyone who wants to speak 
the ‘truth’ must bow to the control principles of a legitimate discourse, satisfy 
certain requirements, and be qualified to engage in the discourse (Foucault 
1970). However, when two differentiated justification discourses come into 
conflict, we can see that the one exerts pressure on the other, and the latter may 
be discredited. A sociology of critique must, as Thévenot (2011) rightly argues, 
also make an unformulated critique visible: “It helps to situate public critique 
within a range of reactions to the feeling of oppression, from mute humiliation 
to outbursts of violence, from words of anger to argued statements” (ibid., 62).  
Following Boltanski (Boltanski 2010, 155 ff.), it can also be assumed that 
people like Ms. Fischer see themselves as subjected to an existential examina-
tion: faced with the question “Organ donation – yes or no?”, it is not a matter 
of making a lapidary decision – Ms. Fischer is affected, i.e. upset, experiences 
shame, sees her position as scarcely communicable and is disqualified in her 
feelings. In essence, she rebels against the testing of the value of her person 
without being able to directly challenge the examination (the exhortation to be 
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willing to donate her organs) or to eliminate this examination. It would now 
depend on translating these feelings (or: critique in statu nascendi) into an 
explicit language of critique, which then would enable social change. And 
sociology could certainly take an active part in such processes and help to 
formulate a critique which may contribute to a change of discourse. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas formulated a program that is 
still of great interest to us today (Habermas 1972). He discusses the notion of 
critique with regards to the attitude psychotherapists take towards their clients 
and analysands. According to Habermas, one of the tasks of therapy is to put 
the people involved in a position to take part in discourses by virtue of the fact 
that it helps the analysands to overcome their own delusions about themselves. 
The critique aims at a practical reorganization of the client’s self-image, 
whereby the latter has the last word in deciding what interpretation is applica-
ble. Sociology would also be well suited to the task of critique – firstly to iden-
tify the positions that are systematically excluded from the discourse and sec-
ondly to put the parties involved in a position where they are able to obtain 
clarity about the reasons for their reluctance – in the case of organ donation: so 
that they can have faith in the integrity of their judgement and introduce this 
into the discourse. This process of reconstruction depends on establishing a 
dialogue with the people affected. A second-order reflection of this kind thus 
aims at symmetrical participation (Celikates 2009), such that a sociology of 
critique and critical theory should both no longer only speak about and for the 
actors but also constitutively depend on a dialogue with them. 
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